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Non-technical summary
In 2002, the Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO) introduced a Notice on the Com-
petitive Treatment of Vertical Restraints in Automobile Trade (‘Car Notice’). The objective
of the Car Notice has been to strengthen competition in the Swiss car market, in partic-
ular by avoiding price-fixing practices and market foreclosure and stimulating intrabrand
competition in the market for new car sales and competition in the service market. The
Car Notice follows the key provisions of the EU Block Exemption Regulation of 2002 in the
motor vehicles sector.
In this paper, we investigate the eﬀects of the Car Notice on competition in the Swiss
car market. Based on a survey among Swiss car market players, we find that the Car Notice
only had a small impact on competition in the Swiss car market. The most evident changes
are observed in the service market and in the trade with car spare parts. In those two
areas, competition is fostered through large dealers and independent service chains due to
a simplified access to car spare parts of diﬀerent qualities and to the necessary technical
information. In the market for new car sales, a restructuring of the dealer network together
with a partial dealer consolidation has been observed. The Car Notice eased this development
as it has been taken as an opportunity to negotiate new contracts with dealers. However,
the survey also revealed that the implementation of the Car Notice has created a lot of
uncertainty and ambiguities between the dealers and car importers. As a consequence, entry
in these parts of the car market has become more complicated. In addition, some (derived)
aims of the Car Notice were not (fully) reached such as, for example, an intensified use of
multibranding, a separation of service and sales, a larger independence of the dealers from
the car importers, higher parallel imports as well as a fostering of intrabrand competition in
the market for new car sales.
In general, although some changes have been identified after the introduction of the
Car Notice, these changes typically cannot solely be explained by the impact of the Car
Notice. These changes rather result from general market developments that have led to
stronger competition in Switzerland. However, we find some indications that this process
was supported by the Car Notice. In general, the eﬀects in the Swiss car market appear to
be similar to the eﬀects of the 2002 EU BER in the European car market.
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Im Jahre 2002 hat die Schweizer Wettbewerbskommission eine Bekanntmachung über die
wettbewerbsrechtliche Behandlung vertikaler Abreden im Kraftfahrzeughandel eingeführt.
Ziel der Bekanntmachung war es, den Wettbewerb im Schweizer Automobilmarkt zu stärken,
insbesondere durch die Vermeidung von Preisabsprachen und Marktabschottung einerseits
sowie die Stimulierung von Wettbewerb beim Neuwagenverkauf und im Bereich Service an-
dererseits. Die Bekanntmachung folgt in den wesentlichen Punkten den Regelungen der
Europäischen Kommission im Bezug auf den Automobilmarkt.
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir die Eﬀekte der Bekanntmachung auf den Wettbe-
werb im Schweizer Automobilmarkt. Auf Basis einer Befragung verschiedener Gruppen von
Schweizer Marktteilnehmern stellen wir fest, dass der Einfluss der Bekanntmachung auf den
Wettbewerb im Schweizer Automobilmarkt als relativ gering eingeschätzt werden muss. Die
oﬀensichtlichsten Änderungen lassen sich im Markt für Service sowie dem Handel mit Er-
satzteilen beobachten. In diesen beidenMärkten wurde ein intensivererWettbewerb zwischen
größeren Händlern und unabhängigen Serviceketten durch einen vereinfachten Zugang zu Er-
satzteilen verschiedener Qualitätsgrade sowie den notwendigen technischen Informationen er-
leichtert. Im Markt für Neuwagenverkäufe konnte ferner eine Restrukturierung und teilweise
auch Konsolidierung des Händlernetzwerks beobachtet werden. Die Bekanntmachung hat
diese Entwicklungen erleichtert, da sie als Gelegenheit aufgefasst wurde, neue Verträge mit
den Händlern zu verhandeln. In diesem Zusammenhang hat die Bekanntmachung allerdings
auch zu einer großen Unsicherheit zwischen Händlern und Autoimporteuren geführt und auf
diese Weise den Marktzutritt erschwert. In Ergänzung dazu verdeutlicht die Befragung, dass
einige abgeleitete Ziele der Bekanntmachung entweder gar nicht oder nur teilweise erreicht
wurden. Dies betriﬀt beispielsweise die Bedeutung des Mehrmarkenverkaufs, die Trennung
von Service und Verkauf, die Unabhängigkeit der Händler von den Autoimporteuren, die
Bedeutung von Parallelimporten sowie generell den intrabrand Wettbewerb im Markt für
Neuwagenverkäufe.
Generell muss abschließend betont werden, dass trotz der Identifizierung bestimmter Än-
derungen im Markt diese typischerweise nicht ausschließlich als Folge der Bekanntmachung
angesehen werden können, sondern vielmehr auch das Ergebnis genereller Marktentwick-
lungen sind, die zu einem teilweise intensiveren Wettbewerb in der Schweiz geführt haben.
Wir finden allerdings einige Hinweise darauf, dass dieser Prozess durch die Bekanntmachung
positiv unterstützt wurde. Insgesamt scheinen die Eﬀekte der Bekanntmachung auf dem
Schweizer Automobilmarkt sehr vergleichbar mit den Eﬀekten der 2002 EU Gruppenfreistel-
lungsverordnung auf dem Europäischen Automobilmarkt zu sein.
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1 Introduction
The organisation of the car distribution system has always been a hot topic at the level
of the European competition authorities. In 1985, various existing individual exemptions
under Article 81 of the EC Treaty were institutionalized into the EU Block Exemption
Regulation (BER) for the entire automobile industry. This block exemption legalized the
combination of selective and exclusive distribution systems for the European car market. As
a consequence, the car manufacturers were allowed to select authorized dealers and to assign
them an exclusive territory. In addition, the car manufacturers were allowed to prohibit
dealers to sell multiple brands (Brenkers and Verboven, 2006, Verboven, 2009).
The EU BER of 2002 aimed to create a system that allows more flexibility and prevents
the adoption of a standardized distribution system by all car manufacturers. According to the
new rules, the car producers are free to choose either a selective or an exclusive distribution
system, however, they are not allowed to combine both systems anymore. Through these
changes, the European Commission aimed to promote intrabrand competition at both the
national and the international level thereby mitigating several competition concerns. For
example, increased intrabrand competition could reduce or even eliminate international price
discrimination as well as the double marginalization problem at the national level.
With its Notice on the Competitive Treatment of Vertical Restraints in Automobile Trade
(‘Car Notice’)1, the Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO) intended to follow the key
provisions of the EU BER of 2002 in the motor vehicles sector and to bring the Swiss car
market rules in accordance with the established practice of the European Commission. Such
an adoption has already been observed in the past, for example, when the rules of the EU
BER of 1985 were imposed on the Swiss car market players.
The objective of the Swiss Car Notice was to strengthen competition in the automobile
market, in particular by avoiding price-fixing practices and market foreclosure and stimulat-
ing intrabrand competition and competition in the service markets (WEKO, 2002). In this
paper, we investigate whether these objectives have been achieved, in particular, whether ex-
isting competition concerns in the car distribution system have been addressed, what eﬀects
the Car Notice has had on the Swiss car market and what policy recommendations could be
derived.
In general, based on our survey among Swiss car market players, we find that the Car
Notice only had a small impact on competition in the Swiss car market. Although some
changes have been identified, they typically cannot solely be explained by the impact of the
Car Notice. These changes rather result from general market developments that have led to
stronger competition in Switzerland. However, we find some indications that this process
was supported by the Car Notice. In general, the eﬀects in the Swiss car market appear to
be similar to the eﬀects of the 2002 EU BER in the European car market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we present the building blocks
of the Car Notice and give a short overview of previous studies of the European and Swiss
car markets. Subsequently, we present the results of the survey among market players. We
conclude the paper with a discussion of the economic eﬀects of the Car Notice and a summary
of the most important findings.
1See WEKO (2002). Throughout the article, we we will refer to this Notice as “Car Notice”.
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2 The Swiss car market regulation at a glance
With its Car Notice, the COMCO intended to follow the EU BER of 2002 in the motor
vehicles sector and bring the Swiss car market rules in accordance with the established
practice of the European Commission in the motor vehicles sector.
The building blocks of the Notice are as follows:
Distribution of new cars: Selective and exclusive distribution systems cannot be combined
anymore, i.e. manufacturers have to choose between the two systems. Parallel imports are
allowed. Car importers or producers are not allowed to hinder multi-brand businesses, i.e.,
they may not restrict the possibility of the seller to oﬀer several brands in the same showroom.
The authorized dealers can set their prices for the final consumers without any restrictions
imposed by car importers.
Sale and supply of spare parts: Sales and parallel imports of car spare parts have been
simplified. Importers must allow original parts supplies or supplies of car parts of matching
quality of other producers to enter the Swiss market if they fulfil the respective quality
criteria.
Aftersales servicing: Every car dealer is allowed to sell any brand without being obliged
to provide services for that brand. Independent repair shops have guaranteed access to car
parts, technical information (including education), and diagnostic instruments. Importers
are allowed to issue quality criteria for service and repair works. However, they are forced by
law to admit every garage that fulfils the corresponding criteria into their dealer network as
an authorized garage. Furthermore, the authorized dealers are obliged to repair all cars of the
same brand (from a sales point in the European Economic Area (EEA) or in Switzerland)
in the boundaries of the warranty and to conduct service and all repairs for free in the
boundaries of a potential callback action.
In addition to the Car Notice as such, the COMCO has published “Explanations of the
Competition Commission to the Car Notice about the Competitive Treatment of Vertical
Restraints in Automobile Trade”2. As a response to the strong interest of the market players
to the published Car Notice, especially to its implementation in practice, the objective of
the explanations has been to provide answers to the most frequently asked questions.
The Car Notice bears a reference to the Regulation of the European Commission No.
1400/2002 as of 31 July, 2002 in the motor vehicles sector that came into eﬀect on 1 October,
2002.3 Although the Car Notice takes into account the existing economic and legal conditions
in Switzerland, the contents of the EC Regulation and the Swiss Car Notice rules are very
similar. The Notice replaces the COMCO Decree about Exclusive Contracts in the Motor
Vehicles Sector (WEKO, 1997)). According to the transition period rule, the Car Notice
came into eﬀect on 1 November 2002. The existing dealer contracts had to be brought in
line with the Car Notice until 1 January 2005.
2The document is available at: http://www.weko.admin.ch/dokumentation/00160/index.html?lang=de.
3See European Commission (2002). Throughout the article, we refer to this regulation as ‘EU BER of
2002’. The EU BER of 2002 replaced the EU regime of 1985 that had been reformed in 1995 (EU Regulation
No. 1475/95).
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3 Previous studies on the eﬀects of the EU BER and
the Swiss Car Notice
Several empirical studies are available that either investigate selected problems of the
EU BER of 1995 or investigate possible scenarios for the BER reform of 2002. Furthermore,
some studies analyse the eﬀects of the liberalization of the EU car market based on the EU
BER of 2002.
One key hypothesis investigated in several studies is whether the combination of selective
and exclusive distribution systems in the past has hindered cross-border trade and led to
price discrimination in the European car market. In this respect, Degryse und Verboven
(2000) provide a summary of various reasons for the observed car prices diﬀerences in the
European Union that includes diﬀerences in the car model specifications, margins, taxes,
exchange rate variations, etc. As a consequence, the European price diﬀerences must not be
an immediate consequence of the set up of the distribution systems in car trade.
Additionally, some studies analyse specific challenges of the car distribution systems such
as the separation of service and sales (Autopolis (2000) and Dr. Lademann & Partner (2001))
and the access to technical information (IKA (2004)). The study of Autopolis (2000), for
example, states that there generally is no natural link between sales and service. The link
is often artificially enforced and is producer- rather than market-driven, however, it also
cannot be denied that a significant group of customers exists that value a link between
sales and service (‘one-stop shopping’). The study of Dr. Lademann & Partner (2001)
came to the conclusion that a customer already considers after-sales servicing possibilities at
the time of purchasing a car and that brand-exclusive distribution and after-sales servicing
is the most favoured option of car customers. Furthermore, new sales channels such as,
for example, the internet, are more accepted by the customers when they are linked to a
minimum service level. Additionally, both studies argue that the EU BER of 1995 has given
the automobile industry the possibility to link the sales and service of new cars through
selective and exclusive contracts. The IKA (2004) study finds that the situation of the
independent repairers has improved after the adoption of the EU BER in 2002, whereas the
access to technical information is still restricted by high prices and the incompatibility of
diﬀerent information systems.
Andersen (2001) studies the economic eﬀects of the possible legislative scenarios for the
2002 reform of the car distribution system on competition in the European car market.
Complementary, separate problems of the current distribution system such as, for example,
the link of sales and service, multi-branding, access to technical information, etc. have been
investigated under diﬀerent scenarios.
On a more general level, Brenkers and Verboven (2006) simulated and quantified the
eﬀects of the 2002 liberalization of the European car market by estimating a structural
model for the European car market. London Economics (2006) investigated the ex-post
eﬀects of the EU BER of 2002. The results of their evaluation of competition in the EU car
market after the reform are, however, mixed. While competition seems to function well in
the market for new cars, competition concerns in the service and repair market as well as
in the market for car spare parts were identified. Additionally, the study of the European
Commission (2008) on the eﬀects of the EU BER of 2002 finds that the competitive situation
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in the market for new cars, service and repair market as well as the market for car spare parts
has improved between 2002 and 2007. Interbrand competition has indeed been strengthened.
However, this observation could also be explained by factors other than the introduction of
the EU BER of 2002 such as over-capacities, innovations, and intensified market integration
in car markets. In general, the majority of studies come to the conclusion that the EU BER
of 2002 mainly had positive eﬀects. However, many detailed BER industry-specific rules are
viewed as unnecessary and overly complicated.
In addition to studies on the eﬀects of the EU BER of 2002, there also exist several
car market studies that provide evidence about the eﬀects of the COMCO Car Notice on
competition in the Swiss car market. For example, according to a UBS (2007a) survey,
price-fixing practices among car importers disappeared in Switzerland. The dealers are
free to choose the car brands they would like to sell and repair. However, it remains unclear
whether the liberalization of the car market will lead to a consolidation of the dealer network.
In the years following the Car Notice, large sums were invested by car dealers into showrooms
and special equipment in order to meet the stricter requirements of the car producers and
importers.
In another survey, UBS (2007b) argues that despite strong competition in the car market
and new rules on the basis of the Car Notice, there has been no significant ‘shake-out’ in
the Swiss car market. According to business census data, in October 2005, 15,429 businesses
were registered in the car sector — a reduction of only about 2% compared to 2001. The
number of sales outlets (+15%) and petrol stations (+8%) has increased, whereas the number
of repair and service shops has decreased by 2%.
With respect to Swiss car prices, a study by Galambos (2007) identified a downward
trend since the introduction of the Car Notice in 2002. Furthermore, garages and dealers
have adjusted their business practices in order to compete under the newmarket environment
following the Car Notice. Some smaller businesses, however, either ceased to exist or are
facing bankruptcy.
A survey of Swiss and German car dealers and dealership groups has been conducted
by Dudenhöﬀer et al. (2006) which especially investigated the structure of the distribution
channels and the service market. Furthermore, Evenett andMeier (2007) estimate the welfare
eﬀects of the Car Notice of 2002 for the Swiss customers and their impact on prices. The
authors ascertain that the car prices in the middle and luxury car market segments have
decreased as a consequence of the Car Notice of 2002 by 4.2% (cumulatively for 2003-2004)
and 6.6% (cumulatively for 2004-2005) respectively after having accounted for transport
costs, exchange rate fluctuations, and inflation rates in the price variation.
Finally, a study by ZHAW (2009) finds that the Car Notice has intensified competition
in the Swiss car market. Both intrabrand and interbrand competition has increased between
2002 and 2008. The number of multibrand dealerships has also increased considerably. The
margins in the market for new car sales are under pressure so that the Swiss car price level
has become closer to the EU car price level.
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4 Results of the survey
In this section, we summarize the results of our survey among car importers, deal-
ers/producers of car spare parts, dealers and associations in Switzerland. The car importers
are relatively well represented in our survey. The same holds true for the service market,
especially for the independent after sales market. In contrast, the dealers and garages are
underrepresented in our survey. Additionally we interviewed several competition lawyers to
obtain a diﬀerent perspective of the car market and the role of the Car Notice in the recent
market developments. In sum, we conducted 15 interviews between January and April 2008.
4.1 Developments in the market for new car sales
Restructuring of the dealer network
The car importers have used the Car Notice — in combination with several other factors
— as an opportunity to restructure and optimize their dealer network. In the aftermath of
the introduction of the Notice, the negotiation process for new contracts between the car
importers and dealers turned out to be partly diﬃcult. In addition to a general uncertainty
due to the new rules in the car market, some car importers further increased their require-
ments and investment obligations for the dealers. In particular, a number of small dealers
perceived these requirements as being too high and decided to leave the authorized dealer
network. The majority of them decided to become independent dealers. In general, due
to these developments, market entry has become more diﬃcult in the years after the intro-
duction of the Car Notice. Only a few new dealers have joined the dealer networks of car
importers.
Intrabrand and interbrand competition
According to some respondents, the Car Notice has not led to more intrabrand or in-
terbrand competition in the Swiss car market. Other respondents, however, argued that
it is unclear whether competition in the car market has intensified due to the Car Notice.
For example, a recently observed increase in the number of dealership groups could lead to
less competition under certain circumstances. Additionally, some respondents stated that
competition from other car brands has intensified. More intensive interbrand competition
might arise through a larger number of dealership groups as well as multi-brand businesses.
According to several respondents, although there has been intensive competition and high
pricing pressure on the Swiss car market, this has first of all been driven by the globalization
trends in the car markets. In addition, the Swiss car customers have become more price-
sensitive. Consequently, the observed increase in the competition intensity in the Swiss car
market cannot be solely explained by the Car Notice.
It was argued further that, in spite of the stronger competition pressure, there remains a
price diﬀerence between new cars on the Swiss and EU car markets. This could be partially
explained by the better equipment of the Swiss car models. Equipment features that are
built in the car for an additional charge in the EU are available within a standard car model
in Switzerland.
Multi-brand dealers
According to the majority of respondents, the Car Notice had practically no impact on
the practice of taking an additional brand into the brand portfolio of the dealers. This is
6
true for adding another brand of the same car manufacturer group as well as for another
brand of a competing manufacturer group. Most dealers who decided to take an additional
brand into their business soon decided to reverse this decision. One of the reasons for
this development was that the dealers overestimated their capabilities and the potential for
synergies. Multibranding is argued to be a very complicated business as every brand has
to be conducted as a separate business and the expectations of the car importers towards
the dealers are very high and complicated. Although multibrand businesses have some
tradition in Switzerland, the Car Notice did not trigger a permanent increase in the number
of multibrand dealers.
Consolidation trend
According to the majority of respondents, the consolidation pressure on the dealers in-
creased in recent years. This development may be partially attributed to the high quality
standards imposed by the car importers. However, some respondents argued that this con-
solidation trend has not been significant so far. The consolidation process has been first of
all driven by the large dealership groups ‘Emil Frey’ and ‘AMAG’. Large companies would
rather appear in the market for new car sales than in the service and repair market and in
the market for car spare parts. The consolidation process is reflected in a decreasing number
of owners, while the reduction in the number of locations is, on the contrary, not so signifi-
cant. Some respondents argued that they do not expect any further consolidation of the car
market. The dealers are not ready to invest and to expand their businesses. Especially, the
financing expenses and investment obligations are considered as particularly high.
Selling cars through dealership groups is often viewed as a solution for certain
towns/regions with low sales volumes and without sales growth potential or as a (temporary)
solution for brand quality problems of the car importers. The car dealers criticise the equal
status of all brands within a dealership group and the absence of bargaining power. Large
dealership groups often have a diﬀerent regional focus which might cause anticompetitive
eﬀects as they can eliminate competition among dealers.
According to the majority of respondents, the number of cars sold per dealer is unlikely to
change substantially in the near future. The demand for small businesses will likely remain
especially due to factors such as language or topography. The local market boundaries are
clearly defined, and consequently, no sales growth is expected in the future.
Parallel/direct imports
According to most respondents, parallel car imports have not increased as a result of
the Car Notice. All respondents expect that they will not increase in the future either.
Premium brands and especially niche brands are more interesting for parallel car importers
than volume brands. The exchange rate has a large impact on the dimension of parallel
imports.
Direct imports by the final car customers are possible but they are associated with high
administration expenses as each car needs a type homologation from the Federal Roads
Oﬃce (Bundesamt für Strassen (ASTRA)). In addition, the parallel or direct car imports
have become less attractive as a result of the harmonization of the Swiss and EU new car
prices.
Innovative distribution channels
All respondents doubt that innovative distribution channels such as the internet will have
a growing importance in the market for new car sales and car spare parts in the near future.
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While purchasing a new car, the emotions and the physical presence of the product plays a
large role. The internet fulfils a function as information and marketing medium rather than
a function as a platform for new car sales. However, for parallel car importers, the role of
the internet is likely to be more significant as their oﬀer of cars is often only available online.
Furthermore, the internet already plays a large role in the market for used cars.
4.2 Developments in the service market
Competition in the service market
According to some respondents, the adoption of the Car Notice has not led to any eﬀective
change in the Swiss service market. Several large system suppliers serve the independent
service market; however, these organisations already existed before the Car Notice. The
system suppliers compete partially directly with the car importers (for example, with respect
to car spare parts, lubricants, etc.). Some respondents argued that the Car Notice has led
to the liberalization of the service market with the largest winners being the independent
garages that have gained business opportunities (such as, for example, the simplified purchase
of the car spare parts, improved access to technical information and diagnostic instruments).
The system suppliers have also benefitted from the widening of the customer base.
According to most respondents, the expectation that the authorized service market will
purchase spare parts more often in the independent service market has not been realized
although the usual practice of the authorized garages to purchase some car spare parts on
the independent service market has been legitimized. The authorized car dealers are often
bound to order/buy nearly all car spare parts from the car importer. One key reason is
the existence of bonus systems that bind the dealers more strongly to the car importers.
According to such bonus systems, the dealers get rebates after they have sold a certain
amount of new cars or car spare parts. However, the large system suppliers oﬀer advantages
such as availability, speed and competence. According to most respondents, it is against the
facts to argue that the independent service market is hindered by the car importers in the
purchase/supply of the original spare parts. Dealers and garages that would like to avoid
the close relationship to the importers often become independent businesses.
Development of service chains
The opinions about the current and future role of service chains such as A.T.U in Switzer-
land are divided. Some respondents have argued that the service chains deliver good service
but they do not meet the needs of the average Swiss car customer. Therefore, the service
chains are unlikely to establish their position in the Swiss car market. This expectation was
justified by the strong local and personal relationships of the car customers as well as the
Swiss topography. Furthermore, in the service area, labour costs represent a high share of
total costs. This is especially true for service chains, service garages and dealers that oﬀer
both sales and service to the same extent and therefore makes it particularly diﬃcult to gain
a cost advantage for any type of service business.
Some respondents have argued further that the development of service chains could have
slowed down through the combination of product and service packages. When oﬀering a
bundle consisting of a new car, service, and insurance at a single monthly price, there is no
incentive for car customers to have certain repairs done by service chains. Although it is
argued that this bundling is demanded by the car customers, it factually reduces the entry
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possibilities and growth expectations of independent service chains.
In contrast, other respondents argued that the service chains will maintain their market
share in the Swiss car market. However, they are expected to have a limited potential for
future growth in Switzerland. The customers’ attitude towards the independent garages is
influenced by several factors. For example, on the one hand, some garages have given up
their brand relationship during their contract negotiations with the car importers while the
relationships to the car customers continue to exist. On the other hand, service chains have
entered the Swiss car markets that do not have any established customer-brand relation-
ship which, however, could develop in the years to come. Therefore, the acceptance of the
independent garages could increase further and might intensify competition in the service
market. Such a development is further promoted by an increased awareness of customers
that the relationship to a particular brand garage is not a given. The increase in advertising
of the service chains and their intended expansion of the branch network in Switzerland may
have contributed to these recent developments.
Separation of service and sales
According to some respondents, it is rather uncommon that a dealer will give up the
dealing of cars and continue to oﬀer service only. Typically, an integrated dealer makes
more profit from after-sales services than from the sale of new cars. The latter activity,
however, serves to create a customer base for repair and maintenance services. Furthermore,
sales problems and risks by the sales of new cars could be compensated through the service
business so that a dealership can stay profitable. Only a few garages concentrate solely on
service. These are rather well-established garages with a settled customer base which has
strong personal ties to the particular garage.
The other respondents have stated that some small garages have given up the sales of
new cars and have concentrated on services instead. Given the generally high standards for
the sales of cars, a critical number of cars must be sold in a particular period to break-even.
In cases where these required sales volumes are not reached, the only alternative is a full
specialization in the service business. In Switzerland, a garage with two or three mechanics
can operate profitably. This is particularly true for rural areas in which a customer may
undertake a longer journey to buy a car, however, prefers to have the service for the car
close to the area where he lives. This constellation gives smaller service garages in rural
areas an opportunity to stay in business.
Access to technical information
The majority of respondents have argued that access to technical information, trainings
etc. is open for all types of garages, independent and authorized, under identical conditions
(such as, for example, product prices). A few respondents have argued that although it
is theoretically possible to get all the required technical information, in practice, access to
technical information remains very complicated. On the one hand, the respective data is
not always disclosed and, on the other hand, the acquisition of technical information can be
quite expensive.
Innovative distribution channels
According to most respondents, the internet is especially important for the system sup-
pliers in the sales and distribution stage. However, it is a technical medium and has not
been fostered by the Car Notice. The costs of the system suppliers could be reduced with
the set-up of internet sales and marketing that could eventually lead to a price decrease in
9
the service and repair market.
4.3 Developments in the market for car spare parts
According to most respondents, there have been no eﬀective changes in the market for
car spare parts as a result of the Car Notice. In general, price competition in this market
has increased and will eventually lead to cheaper car spare parts.
It has been argued further that spare parts of diﬀerent quality levels as well as original
car spare parts are available from the distributors. The Swiss car customers would not
be willing to pay a comparable price for no-name spare parts as for original spare parts.
Warranty services play a large role while choosing spare parts. Overall, the growth potential
in this market is expected to be modest.
With respect to the definition of the respective spare parts, no problems have been
identified. The respondents have not received any complaints and inquiries concerning the
lack of clarity in this respect. The original spare parts are sold under the name of the
producer of the spare parts and not under the name of the car producer.
There have been no identified changes in the use of innovative distribution channels such
as internet in the Swiss market for car spare parts. The new possibilities based on the Car
Notice have not been put into practice by the market players.
4.4 General eﬀects and policy recommendations
According to the respondents, the Car Notice has not changed the competition intensity in
the Swiss car market and the car consumers have not noticed any other significant changes.
Therefore, in this respect, the Notice has not fulfilled the expectations of the car market
players.
However, on the positive side, the Car Notice has brought more transparency and clarity
into the car market. In this respect, it was partly argued that the COMCO should aim at
improving its information and communication policy concerning the implementation of the
Car Notice. For example, the market players should have been informed in advance about
changes in the car market regulation in order to avoid ambiguities between the car importers
and dealers (triggering problems in implementation at the dealer level). Some respondents
have stressed that the implementation, control and enforcement of the Car Notice is very
important. The widespread opinion of the interviews was that the car market does not need
any kind of regulatory intervention.
5 Discussion of the economic eﬀects of the Car Notice
One key objective of our study has been to investigate whether the anti-competitive ef-
fects of the past car distribution system (such as for example, restrictions of cross-border
trade through international price discrimination, restriction of intrabrand competition, in-
ternal trade and interbrand competition, and market foreclosure against competing car parts
manufacturers) have been (at least partially) eliminated due to the Car Notice and whether
eﬃciency gains were realised on the basis of the new relationships in the car market. Such a
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welfare analysis is particularly diﬃcult as, especially in the car sector, vertical restraints are
often justified by economic eﬃciency arguments such as a reduction of double marginaliza-
tion, the creation of service incentives and as a solution to the free-riding problem by dealers.
Given the prevalent data limitations, we refrained from conducting a quantitative analysis
to investigate these issues but concentrated on a qualitative assessment of selected aspects.
Creating service incentives and solving free riding problems by dealers
In general, the car producers aim to ensure an optimal level of the dealer services. The
dealers, however, can have very low incentives to oﬀer service and, as a consequence, the car
producers would like to ensure an optimal service level through vertical agreements.
After 2002, all car producers except for Suzuki chose a selective distribution system. This
system gives the car producers the possibility to oﬀer incentives in the form of bonuses to the
dealers to ensure the optimal degree of service. The bonus, for example, contains qualitative
elements that could further increase the service level. The strict requirements concerning
quality could, however, increase the dependence of the dealers on the car producers, which
is, in fact, observed in the Swiss car market. This strong relationship can restrict entry of
new dealers or new service stations. These foreclosure eﬀects might over-compensate the
benefits of higher service quality for the car customers.
Restrictions of cross-border trade through international price discrimination
The price diﬀerences for new cars between Switzerland and the EU have decreased in
recent years, first and foremost due to increased global competition. Although the 2002 Car
Notice has created more possibilities for parallel imports, they have remained at a low level.
Restrictions of intrabrand competition
The Car Notice has not led to an increase in the variety of the distribution channels. The
internet rather remains an advertising medium. The number of dealers that have given up
their service business and the number of independent dealers or service garages in Switzerland
remained largely stable.
Restrictions of internal trade and interbrand competition
Although the multibranding business has been simplified, it remains a complex business
and has not been extensively implemented in practice. The current dealership groups already
existed before the Car Notice. Interbrand competition is rather stimulated through increased
global competition in the automobile markets.
Market foreclosure against competing car parts manufacturers
In general, the bundling of sales and service could lead to the foreclosure of car spare
parts producers. The separation of sales and service has not been increasingly implemented
in Switzerland. However, no complaints have been expressed that the producers of car
spare parts actually were foreclosed from the market. They can supply their spare parts
through independent trade, although the authorised dealers/garages buy the major part of
the car spare parts from the car importers. It has to remain undecided whether this finding
is a consequence of competition or a result of successful foreclosure of the car spare parts
producers from the authorized market.
In general, the eﬀects of the Car Notice in the Swiss car market appear to be similar to the
eﬀects of the BER in the European car market summarized above. It becomes apparent that
the objectives of the COMCO and the European Commission have not been fully achieved,
in particular with respect to the stimulation of intrabrand competition, independence of the
dealers from car producers, liberalization of the service and repair market as well as the
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market for car spare parts.
6 Conclusions
In 2002, the Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO) introduced a Notice on the Com-
petitive Treatment of Vertical Restraints in Automobile Trade (‘Car Notice’). The objective
of the Car Notice was to strengthen competition in the Swiss car market, in particular by
avoiding price-fixing practices and market foreclosure and stimulating intrabrand competi-
tion as well as competition in the service markets. In this paper, we investigate whether
these objectives have been achieved.
In general, it can be concluded from our survey among Swiss car market players that
the impact of the Car Notice on competition in the Swiss car market has been rather small.
The most evident changes are observed in the service market and in the trade with car spare
parts. In those two areas, competition is fostered through large dealers and independent
service chains due to a simplified access to car spare parts of diﬀerent qualities and to the
necessary technical information. In the market for new car sales, a restructuring of the
dealer network together with a partial dealer consolidation has been observed. The Car
Notice eased this development as it has been taken as an opportunity to negotiate new
contracts with dealers. However, the survey also revealed that the implementation of the
Car Notice has created a lot of uncertainty and ambiguities between the dealers and car
importers. As a consequence, entry in these parts of the car market has become more
complicated. In addition, some (derived) aims of the Car Notice were not (fully) reached
such as, for example, an intensified use of multibranding, a separation of service and sales,
a larger independence of the dealers from the car importers, higher parallel imports as well
as a fostering of intrabrand competition in general.
With respect to policy recommendations, it was stressed that the COMCO should im-
prove its information and communication policy to reduce uncertainty among market players
and should continue its practice of harmonizing the Swiss car market rules with the European
rules. Following the expiration of 2002 EU BER in May 2010, the European Commission
has adopted a new BER No. 461/2010. According to this regulation, in the market for new
car sales, the old rules remain valid until 31 May 2013. After this transition period, the car
producers have to follow the rules specified under the general vertical restraints guidelines.
In the service market and the market for car spare parts, however, the new rules have already
come into force on 1 June 2010. The COMCO recently has responded to the new EU rules
through several adjustments in its Explanations to the Car Notice. It has, however, not (yet)
amended the 2002 Car Notice itself.
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